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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

)

NO. 43471
Jefferson County Case No.
CR-2014-2023

)
BRIAN EDWARD HIRSCHI,

)

Defendant-Appellant.

________________

)
)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

)

Must this Court decline to consider Hirschi's claim that the district court abused
its discretion by requiring, as a condition of probation, he be supervised on a sex
offender caseload because Hirschi did not seek modification of the condition of
probation below and the district court's failure to modify the condition is not fundamental
error?

Hirschi Has Failed To Argue, Much Less Demonstrate, That The Trial Court's Failure To
Modify The Conditions Of Probation Constitutes Fundamental Error
Hirschi prevented his estranged wife from leaving the residence, "pulled a gun"

DEC 3 1 2015
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on her, forced her to remove her clothing, and raped her.

(PSI, p.4. 1)

The state

charged Hirschi with rape. (R., pp.54-56.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hirschi pied
guilty to an amended charge of aggravated assault (R., pp.68-69.) The district court
imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one year fixed, suspended the
sentence, and placed Hirschi on supervised probation for two and one-half years with
the condition he be supervised on the "standard sex offender caseload." (R., pp.108-

'12.) Hirschi accepted the terms of probation on the record in open court and raised no
objections to the conditions set forth by the district court. (Tr., p.24, Ls.19-23.) Hirschi
fi!ed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.116-18.)
Hirschi challenges a term of his probation - that he be supervised on a sex
offender caseload - for the first time on appeal, asserting the district court abused its
discretion by imposing this condition because he was not convicted of a registerable sex
offense and because he had a "low risk for re-offending." (Appellant's Brief, pp.1-4.)
Hirschi's claim is not properly before this Court because he specifically accepted this
condition of probation, without objection, in open court; he never moved for a
modification of this condition of probation below; and the trial court's failure to modify
the condition of probation does not constitute fundamental error.
Pursuant to I.C. § 20-221(1), the trial court may modify any terms or conditions of
probation· at any time.

Additionally, any party may submit to the court a request to

modify the terms and conditions of probation for any probationer under the board's
supervision at any time during the period of probation. I.C. § 20-221 (2).
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file "hirschi,
b.rian PSI CONFIDENTIALl.pdf."
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The proper forum for Hirschi to complain about a term of his probation is the
district court. If Hirschi thought the condition that he be supervised on a sex offender
caseload was unreasonable, he was free to decline probation and demand to have his
sentence executed. State v. Tesheep, 122 Idaho 759, 760, 838 P.2d 888, 889 (Ct. App.
1992) (citing State v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho 853, 861, 952 P.2d 350, 358 (1969)). Hirschi
bears the burden of presenting a record to substantiate his argument on an appeal.
State v. Langley, 115 Idaho 727, 769 P.2d 604 (Ct. App. 1989). The record does not
reflect that Hirschi ever objected to this condition below.

To the contrary, when the

district court advised Hirschi he did not "have to accept probation" and asked whether
he accepted the terms of probation - including the condition he be supervised on a sex
offender caseload - set forth by the court, Hirschi responded, "I accept it, Your Honor."
(Tr., p.23, Ls.12-25; p.24, Ls.19-23.) Likewise, Hirschi did not file a motion to modify
t:iis term of his probation in the district court.

Because Hirschi did not present his

grievance to the district court, he failed to preserve the issue for appeal. State v. Lavy,
121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992); State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824
P.2d 109, 111 (1991); State v. Breeden, 129 Idaho 813, 816, 932 P.2d 936, 939 (Ct.
App. 1997) (holding that because defendant failed to object to restitution as a condition
of probation or file a motion to modify the terms and conditions of probation, defendant
failed to preserve the issue for appeal).
It is well-settled that "Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not
preserved for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224,
245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 896, 894 P.2d 125,
129 (1995)); accord State v. Carter, 155 Idaho 170, 173, 307 P.3d 187, 190 (2013). An
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exception to this rule exists if the alleged error constitutes fundamental error.

Perry,

150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976. The Idaho Supreme Court has clarified that "al!
claims of unobjected-to error in criminal cases are now subject to the fundamental error
test set forth in Perry." Carter, 155 Idaho at 173, 307 P.3d at 190; see also Carter, 155
Idaho at 174, 307 P.3d at 191 (holding "the fundamental error test is the proper
standard for determining whether an appellate court may hear claims based upon
unobjected-to error in all phases of criminal proceedings in the trial courts of this state").
However, the burden of demonstrating fundamental error rests squarely with the
defendant asserting the error for the first time on appeal. Perry 150 Idaho at 228, 245
P.3d at 980. To carry that burden, a defendant claiming error for the first time on appeal
must demonstrate the error he alleges "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information
not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to
object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless."

!SL

quoted in Carter, 155

Idaho at 173, 307 P.3d at 190.
Application of the foregoing principles to the facts of this case shows Hirschi
waived appellate consideration of his claim that the trial court erred by failing to modify
the condition of probation that he be supervised on a sex offender caseload. Hirschi did
not file a motion to modify the conditions of his probation below and did not otherwise
ask the sentencing court to consider modifying the condition of probation that he be
supervised on a sex offender caseload.

(See generally R.)

Nor has he argued on

appeal that the sentencing court's unobjected-to decision to require he be supervised
on a sex offender caseload constitutes fundamental error under the standards
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articulated in Perry, supra. (See generallv Appellant's Brief, pp.1-4.) Even if he had,
claim would fail under the first prong of Perry, which requires Hirschi to demonstrate
a violation of one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228,
245 P.3d at 980. Hirschi has not cited any constitutional right he believes is implicated
in relation to his complaint, much less established a violation of any right.
Hirschi may yet file a motion to modify the conditions of his probation. However,
because the issue was not raised below, and because Hirschi has not even asserted
fundamental error, much less carried his burden of establishing it, this Court must
decline to consider the merits of Hirschi's claim that the trial court abused its discretion
by requiring, as a condition of his probation, that he be supervised on a sex offender
caseload.
Even if this Court addresses the merits of Hirschi's claim, Hirschi has still failed to
establish an abuse of discretion. A trial court is authorized to make probation subject to
"such terms and conditions as it deems necessary and expedient." I.C. § 19-2601 (2).
"The goal of probation is to foster the defendant's rehabilitation while protecting public
safety." State v. Wardle, 137 Idaho 808, 810, 53 P.3d 1227, 1229 (Ct. App. 2002)
(citations omitted).

Although trial courts have broad discretion in the imposition of

restrictive terms, the conditions of probation must be reasonably related to the
rehabilitative and public safety goals of probation.

lQ.,_

Whether the terms and

conditions of a defendant's probation are reasonably related to the goals of probation is
a legal question over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Jones,
123 Idaho 315,318,847 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Ct. App.1993).
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The condition of probation that Hirschi be supervised on a sex offender caseload

is reasonably related to the goals of rehabilitation and protecting public safety.

Hirschi's

conviction for aggravated battery in the instant offense was the result of an incident

wherein he pulled a gun on his estranged wife, forced her to remove her clothing, and
raped her despite her repeated protestations that she "did not want to."

(PSI, p.4.)

Hirschi later acknowledged the victim "experienced 'the sexual act as it indeed was: a
rape."' (PSI, pp.14, 22, 71.) The instant offense appears to represent an escalation in
Hirschi's violent conduct, as it was preceded by at least two separate instances of
violence toward his estranged wife, one of which '"was quite violent and resulted in
significant injuries to"' her. (PSI, pp.20-21, 55-56.) Following Hirschi's commission of
the instant offense, both the psychosexual evaluator and the presentence investigator
recommended Hirschi be supervised on a sex offender caseload and participate in sex
offender treatment to allow for "early intervention in the process of escalation toward
sexual or violent offending" and to protect the community.

(PSI, pp.22-23, 74.) As

such, it was entirely reasonable for the district court to follow the recommendations and
require Hirschi to be supervised on a sex offender caseload as a condition of probation
iii order to foster Hirschi's rehabilitation while protecting public safety.

Given any

reasonable view of the facts, Hirschi has failed to establish the district court abused its
discretion by requiring that he be supervised on a sex offender caseload as a condition

of his probation.
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Hirschi's conviction and
sentence.
DATED this 31st day of December, 2015.
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JESSI~~
ttorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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